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REAL WAGE CYCLICALITY OF JOB STAYERS, WITHIN-COMPANY 
JOB MOVERS, AND BETWEEN-COMPANY JOB MOVERS
PAUL J. DEVEREUX and ROBERT A. HART*
Using the British New Earnings Survey Panel Data for 1975–2001, the authors esti-
mate the wage cyclicality (the degree to which wage levels rise and fall with economic 
upturns and downturns) of three groups:  job stayers, within-company job movers, 
and between-company job movers.  Wages of internal movers, they find, were slightly 
more procyclical, and wages of external movers considerably more procyclical, than 
those of stayers.  The greater cyclicality of movers’ wages is particularly apparent for 
private sector workers and persons not covered by collective agreements.  Neverthe-
less, because job stayers comprised about 90% of all observations in this large sample 
of British workers, the procyclicality of their wages was the predominant determinant 
of the overall procyclical pattern found across all groups.  Thus, the analysis does not 
support the implication of some rigid wage models that employers use job title changes 
to adjust wages to the business cycle.
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 ncreased flexibility is a prime objective 
 of government labor market policy in 
many economies.  Against a recent back-
ground of relatively sluggish economic per-
formance, it has been especially emphasized 
by policy-makers of member countries within 
the European Union.  Central to the goal of 
flexibility has been the attainment of overall 
wage cyclicality, since the closeness of the 
tie between wages and market conditions 
determines the extent to which adverse 
shocks eventuate in wage adjustments rather 
than job losses.  Total wage adjustment de-
rives from three primary sources:  the wage 
changes of workers (a) within single jobs, 
(b) moving between jobs within the same 
company, and (c) moving between different 
companies.
Evidence from panel microdata shows 
that real wage changes of between-company 
movers are more procyclical than wages 
of within-company stayers (Bils 1985; Shin 
1994).  Also, real wages of all job movers—that 
is, within- and between-company job movers 
combined—have been found to be more 
procyclical than wages of job stayers (Hart 
2006).  However, these studies fall short of 
providing detailed evidence concerning the 
process of internal real wage cyclicality.  Is 
within-company wage cyclicality mainly the 
result of internal promotions and demo-
tions, with wage stickiness prevailing within 
and thank Elizabeth Roberts for excellent research 
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individual jobs?  Or does product and labor 
market competition require that within-job 
wages also respond to prevailing market 
conditions?
We investigate the relative importance 
of wage adjustments of job stayers, internal 
movers, and external movers within the Brit-
ish economy.  Britain is generally regarded 
as enjoying the most ﬂexible labor market 
among the main European economies.  We 
make use of a rich panel data set, the New 
Earnings Survey Panel Data (NESPD).  It 
contains a random 1% sample of British 
workers in employment.  The data provide 
highly accurate individual wage and hours 
statistics taken from employers’ company 
payroll records.  Our period of analysis is 
1975 to 2001.
This paper adds to the wage cyclicality 
literature in several ways.  First, the previ-
ous literature that distinguishes between 
internal and external moves is largely based 
on case studies, and the generalizability of 
their results is in some doubt.  By using a 
nationally representative sample of workers, 
we get results that apply to more than just 
individual companies.  Second, our use of 
modern data from Britain complements a 
predominantly U.S.-based literature.  Third, 
because we observe employer changers in 
addition to job changers, we can decom-
pose overall levels of wage cyclicality into 
within-job, within-employer across-job, and 
across-employer components, something that 
previous studies have not done.
Wage Cyclicality of Stayers and Movers
There is little previous literature on wage 
cyclicality that distinguishes between internal 
and external mobility.  Using data from the 
Ford and Byers companies from the 1920s and 
1930s, Solon, Whatley, and Stevens (1997) 
found that the bulk of wage cyclicality in these 
two companies was a result of workers chang-
ing job titles rather than changing wages 
within a job title.  In contrast, Wilson (1997), 
using recent data from two U.S. companies, 
found no evidence that the wages of position 
changers were more cyclical than the wages of 
position stayers.  She found mixed evidence 
for the hypothesis that the rate of position 
changing is procyclical.1  As pointed out 
by Solon et al., the within-job/between-job 
dichotomy within companies is a potentially 
important dimension for research into wage 
cyclicality and one that would beneﬁt from 
more up-to-date and comprehensive data.
Why might wage cyclicality differ between 
job stayers, job movers, and employer mov-
ers?  In a competitive spot market for labor 
in which human capital is general and wages 
of all workers are fully ﬂexible and adjust in 
line with marginal revenue product, there 
are no clear reasons to expect differences in 
the wage cyclicality of these groups.
However, wages may be governed by 
implicit contracts rather than a spot mar-
ket.  Malcomson (1999) summarized this 
literature and described how both risk-shar-
ing and human capital investment motives 
may lead to wages being less ﬂexible than a 
spot market.  In risk-sharing models, risk-
averse workers may be insured by employers 
against ﬂuctuations in their wage income.2 
Similarly, implicit contracts may be used to 
reduce transaction costs or avoid holdup 
problems when speciﬁc or general human 
1Devereux (2000) carried out an exercise similar 
to Wilson’s using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID).  This exercise was limited by a short sample 
period (1981–92) and the noisiness of information on 
internal job mobility in the PSID.
2Malcomson discussed three types of insurance con-
tract, all of which serve to a greater or lesser extent to 
constrain wage responsiveness to current market condi-
tions.  The parties to a fully binding contract agree that, 
over the contractual spell of employment, the real wage 
will be set to reﬂect the market conditions that prevailed 
when the contract was initially drawn up.  Alternatively, 
if the contract is non-binding on the worker, the real 
wage remains constant unless the ﬁrm believes that 
prevailing market conditions may induce a job quit.  If 
the contract is non-binding on the company, the real 
wage will remain constant unless the ﬁrm believes that 
market conditions are such that it will be cost-effective 
to lay off the worker.  Empirical work in North America 
has found that contracts that are non-binding on the 
worker have especially strong inﬂuence on wage behavior 
(Beaudry and DiNardo 1991; McDonald and Worswick 
1999; Grant 2003).  Recent empirical work on the 
importance of implicit contracts in Britain (Devereux 
and Hart 2005) has shown that the spot market plays 
the dominant role in real wage determination but also 
ﬁnds evidence consistent with wage contracts that are 
non-binding on the worker.
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capital acquisition is important (Malcomson 
1999; Hashimoto 1979; Aoki 1984).  Since 
implicit contracts imply some detachment of 
the wages of job stayers from current labor 
market conditions, the wages of company 
changers may be more procyclical than those 
of company stayers.
Less attention has been paid to why the 
wages of job stayers might be less procyclical 
than the wages of job movers who remain in the 
same company.3  If human capital is job-speciﬁc, 
then rent sharing, and its associated effect 
of blunting wage responsiveness to market 
conditions (Hashimoto 1979), may also be 
primarily job-speciﬁc.  Within-company job 
moves would then involve losses of speciﬁc 
capital, and wage changes associated with 
internal job changes might more directly 
reﬂect marginal revenue product and, hence, 
current business cycle conditions.  This 
would predict more procyclical wages for 
job changers (even within companies) than 
for job stayers.4
An alternative model developed by Reyn-
olds (1951), Reder (1955), and Hall (1974) 
assumes that wage levels within job titles are 
unresponsive to the demand conditions faced 
by ﬁrms.  Therefore, employers respond to 
the business cycle by transferring workers 
between job titles so as to adjust labor costs 
appropriately.  For example, in expansions 
ﬁrms lower promotion and hiring standards 
and hence lower the average quality of work-
ers in each job title.  Consequently, real wages 
per quality unit of labor rise even if real 
wages within job titles are rigid.  Similarly, 
in a recession, ﬁrms increase promotion 
and hiring standards and thus reduce the 
wage per unit quality.  The model predicts 
that a substantial proportion of overall wage 
cyclicality results from workers changing job 
titles rather than from wage changes within 
job titles.  This arises either because the rate 
of job title changing is procyclical or because 
the wage changes of internal movers are 
more procyclical than the wage changes of 
job stayers.
Data
The New Earnings Survey Panel Data set 
(NESPD) is comprised of a random sample 
of all individuals whose National Insurance 
numbers end in a given pair of digits.  Each 
year a questionnaire is directed to employers, 
who complete it on the basis of payroll records 
for relevant employees.  The questions relate 
to a speciﬁc week in April.  Since the same 
individuals are in the sample each year, the 
NESPD is a panel data set that runs from 1975 
to the present.  Because National Insurance 
numbers are issued to all individuals who reach 
the minimum school leaving age, the sampling 
frame of the survey is a random sample of the 
population.  Employers are legally required 
to complete the survey questionnaire, so the 
response rate is very high.  Also, individuals can 
be tracked from region to region and employer 
to employer through time using their National 
Insurance numbers.
The questions in the NESPD refer primarily 
to earnings and hours of work.  Since the data 
are taken directly from the employer’s payroll 
records, the earnings and hours information is 
considered very accurate.  The wage measure 
we use is “gross weekly earnings excluding 
overtime divided by normal basic hours for 
employees whose pay for the survey period was 
not affected by absence.”5  We deﬂate wages 
using the British Retail Price Index, as it is the 
United Kingdom’s most widely used price 
index and is similar to the U.S. Consumer 
Price Index (CPI).  The NESPD also includes 
information on age, sex, occupation, industry, 
3In a life cycle context, we know from the work of 
McCue (1996) that position moves within companies are 
potentially important; they are estimated to account for 
15% of male wage growth in the United States.
4A similar argument suggests that internal movers 
will have less cyclical wages than external movers.  Rents 
associated with speciﬁc human capital may derive from 
both job- and company-level knowledge acquisition.  As 
emphasized by Aoki (1984), collective, or company-
speciﬁc, skills may lead to organizational rents that are 
shared between workers and entrepreneurs.  In this 
event, moving between jobs within the company would 
lead to a partial loss of speciﬁc capital, while changing 
companies would lead to total loss.
5We also estimated wage speciﬁcations in which hourly 
earnings (including overtime) replaced hourly standard 
rates.  These produced no substantive changes, and so 
we conﬁne our attention to standard rates throughout 
the paper.
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and geographic location of individuals (but 
not education or race).  We conﬁne atten-
tion to full-time workers holding single jobs. 
Our samples cover 177,000 men and 112,000 
women.  We cannot calculate experience for 
each individual and so we use age as a regres-
sor in its place.
One concern is that employers may re-
port hours worked inaccurately, biasing our 
estimates of wage cyclicality.  In particular, if 
employers report contract hours rather than 
actual hours worked, reported hours will re-
main constant from year to year, resulting in a 
countercyclical bias for hours and a procyclical 
bias for hourly wages.  While there is no way 
to validate the reporting of hours in the NE-
SPD, we have examined the stickiness and the 
cyclicality of reported hours.  We ﬁnd that, on 
average, 80% of stayers had the same reported 
weekly hours in two adjacent periods, with the 
proportion ranging from 61% (in 1981/82) 
to 89% (in 1978/79).  Thus, there seems to 
have been appreciable variation in reported 
hours from year to year, especially given that 
true hours are likely to remain constant for 
most stayers.  Furthermore, reported hours 
were signiﬁcantly procyclical (p < 0.01) for 
both men and women over our sample period, 
once again suggesting that any biases from 
misreporting of hours may not be very large. 
Overall, we believe our hours data are at least as 
good as the self-reported data from individual 
surveys,6 but a thorough examination of this 
issue will require a new system for collecting 
hours information.
Our business cycle proxy is the national 
claimant count unemployment rate produced 
by the British Ofﬁce for National Statistics.7 
Wage agreements in Britain typically cover a 
12-month period, and so the wage measures in 
the NESPD generally refer to wage settlements 
negotiated between April, when the samples 
are taken, and May of the previous year.  Ac-
cordingly, we use as our unemployment rate 
measure the average of the 12 monthly unem-
ployment rates between May of the previous 
year and the survey month of April.
Between one April census and the next, 
the NESPD provides a very clear distinction 
between job stayers and job movers.  A question 
in the Survey records whether an employee has 
remained in a given single job within the com-
pany for more than 12 months or less than 12 
months.  This information allows us accurately 
to identify job movers, deﬁned as individuals 
who have either changed jobs within the same 
company or changed companies.8  For two 
consecutive years of NESPD data we have com-
plete information that allows us to deﬁnitively 
separate internal and external movers.  Before 
we describe our method of determining this 
mover dichotomy for the remaining years, it 
is useful to report key information for these 
two years.
For 1996 and 1997, we know precisely 
whether each job move took place within com-
panies or between companies.  We consider 
the sample of individuals who were employed 
6In order to compare individual self-reporting with 
our company payroll data, we examined the cyclicality of 
basic hours (excluding overtime) in the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) and in the NESPD for the years 
1993–2003 (BHPS) and 1991–2001 (NESPD).  We regressed 
the change in log hours (basic and total) on a constant, 
a time trend, and the change in the unemployment rate. 
Both types of hours were found to be signiﬁcantly pro-
cyclical (p < 0.01) for men and women in the NESPD. 
Virtually identical results were obtained for male basic 
hours using BHPS.  Male total hours in the BHPS were 
found to be more strongly procyclical than their NESPD 
equivalents, while female basic and total hours in the BHPS 
were acyclical.  These regressions were also undertaken 
using our full NESPD sample for the period 1975–2001. 
Again, all speciﬁcations displayed statistically signiﬁcant 
hours procyclicality.
7Our main reason for choosing claimant count data 
is that they allow us to obtain consistent monthly data 
back to 1975.
8The questions used to determine this variable are as 
follows [bold type as used in questionnaire]:
(a) What, if any, is the employee’s full job title and
    rank or grade?  [box to ﬁll in]
(b) Give a short description of the work this 
    employee does.  For engineers and accountants 
    state professional qualifications, if any. 
    [bigger box to ﬁll in]
(c) Has the employee worked in this same job in 
    your organisation for one year or more?
(If the employee has changed to a different job or 
been promoted within the last 12 months then ‘Under 
one year’ is appropriate.)  Circle 1 or 2.
      One year or more 1
      Under one year    2
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at the survey date in both periods (the unem-
ployment rate was about 8% in both years). 
Between the two years, 92% of male workers 
and 91% of female workers remained in 
the same job.  Of the movers, 50% of men 
and 55% of women changed jobs within the 
same company.  Thus, internal mobility is 
quantitatively as important a phenomenon 
as the much more heavily studied external 
mobility.  Let us deﬁne “no wage change” in 
real basic hourly wage rates between the two 
years as a wage in 1997 that remained within 
the bounds of the 1996 wage by ±1%.  Then, 
for both genders, the modal groups of job 
stayers experienced a wage increase—51% of 
men and 53% of women.  But wage reduc-
tions also occurred for large numbers of 
stayers—29% of men and 27% of women. 
In the case of between-company job movers, 
wage reductions affected 34% of men and 
22% of women.9
Apart from 1996 and 1997, a direct break-
down of individuals into within- and between-
company job moves is not possible.  We need, 
therefore, to identify such moves indirectly.  Let 
Mt denote a binary variable indicating that a 
job move took place at time t.  We can obtain 
Mt from the NESPD.  Let Mt = MWt + MBt, where 
MWt denotes a within-company job move and 
MBt denotes a between-company job move.  In 
order to identify MWt and MBt, we adopted the 
following decision rules:
(1) MWt = 1  if Mt does not 
intersect with MBt
        = 0  otherwise.
(2) MBt = 1  if Mt involves a 
change in geographical area, 
industry, or sector (or a com-
bination thereof)
          =  0  otherwise.
We chose three sets of combinations of area, 
industry, and sector to identify MBt in (2):
(A) 10 standard British regions, 1-digit industries, 
and public/private sector;
(B) 97 geographical areas, 1-digit industries, and 
public/private sector;
(C) 97 geographical areas, 3-digit industries, and 
public/private sectors.
Table 1 shows actual and estimated job moves 
and real wage changes for the years 1996 and 
1997 using (A), (B), and (C).  All three cor-
rectly identify about 75% of all moves.  The 
public/private sector split is common to all 
choices.10  By moving from (A) to (C), one 
classiﬁes more of the moves as being external 
and fewer as being internal.  Choice (A) cor-
rectly picks out over 80% of within-company 
movers but incorrectly classiﬁes 35–40% of 
external moves as internal.  Disaggregating 
regions into 97 sub-areas and industries to 
a three-digit breakdown—that is, choice 
(C)—reverses the relative predictive balance 
in favor of between-company movers.  Choice 
(B), consisting of 97 areas combined with 1-
digit industries, produces a reasonably even 
balance and correctly classiﬁes about 75% of 
moves.  These ﬁndings are very similar for 
men and women.11
In the lower part of Table 1 we compare 
actual and estimated real basic hourly wage 
changes (that is, excluding overtime) be-
tween 1996 and 1997.  Real wages rose by an 
average of 6.5% for male stayers.  Of course, 
actual and estimated real wage changes coin-
cide in the case of stayers.  Mean real wage 
changes among both types of movers are over 
twice as large, albeit accompanied by consid-
erably larger standard deviations.  Both ﬁrst 
and second moments are well estimated by 
each of our three mover identiﬁers, although 
choice (A) appears to provide marginally the 
best estimates of the actual means.
Table 2 presents summary statistics, based 
on our complete data set, for the key variables 
underlying the subsequent analysis.  Note 
9The prevalence of downward adjustments to wages in 
Britain is well known.  For example, Nickell and Quintini 
(2003) found that signiﬁcantly larger proportions of 
British workers than of similar U.S. workers experience 
nominal wage cuts or unchanged nominal wages.
10The public sector covers workers in central govern-
ment, local government, and public corporations.
11Consider classiﬁcation scheme (B) for men.  Here, 
447 internal movers are wrongly classiﬁed as external 
movers.  50% of these moved between regions, 38% 
moved between industries, 2% changed sector, 9% 
changed region and industry, 0.2% changed region and 
sector, and 1% changed industry and sector.
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that 90% of men and 88% of women were job 
stayers.  Thus women were slightly more likely 
than men to undertake internal and external 
job moves.  This may reﬂect less contractual 
security in female than male jobs.12
The table also shows how the proportions 
of movers and stayers vary depending on 
whether (A), (B), or (C) is used.  In line 
with the reported ﬁndings in Table 1, Table 
2 also shows that the mean real wage changes 
(expressed in logarithms to conform with our 
estimating equations) are greater for both 
types of movers compared to stayers.
Estimation
Decomposition of Overall Wage Cyclicality
Here, we extend the analysis of Solon, 
Whatley, and Stevens (1997) to the case where 
Table 1.  Job Moves and Real Wage Changes between 1996 and 1997.
Actual and Estimated Within- and Between-Company Job Moves
  Estimated Job Movers
  Correctly Estimated Correctly Estimated
  Internal Movers/ External Movers/
  Total Actual Internal Movers Total Actual External Movers
  (Percent Correct) (Percent Correct)
Mover Identiﬁers Men Women Men Women
(A) 10 Regions, 1-Digit Industries, 1592/1924 1152/1366 1272/1979 714/1151
Public/Private Sector (82.7) (84.3) (64.3) (62.0)
(B) 97 Areas, 1-Digit Industries, 1477/1924 1070/1366 1457/1979 812/1151
Public/Private Sector (76.8) (78.3) (73.6) (70.5)
(C) 97 Areas, 3-Digit Industries, 1215/1924 843/1366 1723/1979 980/1151
Public/Private Sector (63.1) (61.7) (87.1) (85.1)
Actual and Estimated Values of Percentage Real Wage Changes (Standard Deviations)
  Stayers Internal Movers External Movers
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Actual 6.5 6.1 14.6 16.5 12.6 15.5
(24.8) (19.4) (33.6) (31.1) (43.2) (47.8)
Using (A) 6.5 6.1 14.1 16.2 13.0 15.8
(24.8) (19.4) (38.8) (35.3) (38.8) (46.0)
Using (B) 6.5 6.1 13.9 15.5 13.3 16.8
(24.8) (19.4) (39.7) (31.1) (37.9) (48.3)
Using (C) 6.5 6.1 14.7 16.4 12.9 15.8
(24.8) (19.4) (41.5) (25.8) (37.0) (46.7)
12The similarity between men and women in rates of 
external mobility is consistent with prior literature.  For 
the United Kingdom, on the basis of the work-history 
data from the British Household Panel, Booth et al. 
(1999) investigated job tenure and job mobility of men 
and women from 1915 to 1990.  They found that men 
were more likely than women to leave a job involuntarily 
and were likely to display a higher propensity to quit 
their jobs in order to take up alternative employment. 
Women showed higher propensities to leave their 
jobs for other reasons.  In general, Booth et al. found 
that job insecurity was greater for men than women. 
However, and most relevant to the data period of the 
present study, these differences narrowed appreciably 
in the later cohorts of these data.  For the United States, 
Viscusi (1980) found in the 1976 PSID that women had 
higher quit rates than men but that this can be fully 
explained by differing job characteristics and the fact 
that women were less likely to have at least one year 
of ﬁrm tenure.  Also, Blau and Kahn (1981) found in 
the National Longitudinal Surveys of young men and 
women that men and women displayed similar tenden-
cies to quit their jobs.
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there is information on across-company mo-
bility in addition to within-company mobil-
ity.  Let PW and PB denote the proportion of 
workers changing jobs within and between 
ﬁrms, respectively.  Let E(6lnWS), E(6lnWW), 
and E(6lnWB) be the expected wage growth 
of job stayers, within-company movers, and 
between-company movers, respectively.  Over-
all expected wage growth is given by
(3) E(6lnW) = (1 – PW – PB)E(6lnWS)
  + PWE(6lnWW) + PBE(6lnWB)
  = E(6lnWS) + PWE(6lnWW
  – 6lnWS) + PBE(6lnWB  
  – 6lnWS).
Differentiating (3) with respect to the change 
in the unemployment rate, 6U, provides 
a decomposition of total wage cyclicality, 
that is,
(4) ,E(6lnW)/,(6U) = ,E(6lnWS)/,(6U)
     + PW[,E(6lnWW – 6lnWS)/,(6U)] 
     + PB[,E(6lnWB – 6lnWS)/,(6U)]
     + [E(6lnWW – 6lnWS)],PW/,(6U)
     + [E(6lnWB – 6lnWS)],PB/,(6U).
The ﬁrst term is the wage response of 
job stayers (individuals who remained in 
the same job in the same company).  The 
second term deﬁnes the incremental effect 
on wage cyclicality of internal movers relative 
to job stayers.  Similarly, term three deﬁnes 
the incremental wage cyclicality of external 
movers relative to job stayers.  The last two 
terms represent, respectively, the cyclicality 
of internal and external job changes.  Thus, 
three terms comprise wage responses and 
two denote job move probabilities.13  We deal 
with wage and job effects in turn.
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics, 1975–2001.
Men  Women
Mover Identiﬁers (A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C)
Total  Total
Number of Individuals 177,498  112,502
(Number of Observations) (1,346,612)  (644,608)
Job Stayers as Proportion of 
  Total Observations 0.896  0.879
Internal Movers as Proportion 
 of Total Observations 0.068 0.059 0.050 0.083 0.072 0.06
External Movers as Proportion 
  of Total Observations 0.042 0.051 0.067 0.046 0.056 0.076
Mean Age 40  37
(Median Age) (40)  (35)
Mean 6lnwS 0.021  0.030
(Standard Deviation) (0.171)  (0.144)
Mean 6lnwW 0.059 0.057 0.056 0.077 0.075 0.076
(Standard Deviation) (0.231) (0.224) (0.213) (0.196) (0.192) (0.182)
Mean 6lnwB 0.061 0.062 0.062 0.081 0.082 0.080
(Standard Deviation) (0.324) (0.316) (0.303) (0.283) (0.272) (0.260)
Private Sector as Proportion 
   of Total Observations 0.697  0.586
Public Sector as Proportion 
  of Total Observations 0.304  0.414
Bargaining Coverage as Proportion 
  of Total Observations 0.578  0.582
Note:  The three separate estimates for movers are based on the identiﬁers:  (A) 10 regions, 1-digit industries, 
public/private sector; (B) 97 areas, 1-digit industries, public/private sector; (C) 97 areas, 3-digit industries, pub-
lic/private sector.
13Each worker is given equal weight in equation (3). 
This is conceptually different from an economy-wide 
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Estimating Wage Cyclicality
The empirical work constitutes a simple 
extension of the approach of Solon, Whatley, 
and Stevens (1997).  It incorporates the two-
step estimation procedure of Solon, Barsky, 
and Parker (1994) (see also Devereux 2001) 
designed to get around the problem of using 
individual wage and other characteristics 
alongside a national-level cyclical indicator 
(Moulton 1986); the associated year-speciﬁc 
error is likely to result in OLS overestimat-
ing the precision of the unemployment rate 
coefﬁcient.
In step 1, we estimate the wage change 
equation for an individual i at time t.  This 
is given by
(5) 6lnwit = _Ait + Y q0tDt
+ Y q1tMWitDt + Y q2tMBitDt + ¡it,
where wit is the real standard hourly wage 
rate, Ait is a cubic in age, Dt denotes a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the observation is from 
year t, and ¡it is a random error term.  The 
MWD and MBD terms represent interactions 
between the time dummies and the mover 
dummies shown in (1) and (2).
In step 2, the three sets of dummy variable 
estimates qˆjt (j = 0,1,2) are regressed on the 
change in the unemployment rate and a 
linear time trend (from 1 to 26), or
(6) qˆjt = bj0 + bj16Ut + bj2 Yeart + pjt   
(j = 0,1,2)
Estimation of (5) is undertaken using OLS, 
and the second-step regression, equation 
(6), is estimated by weighted least squares 
(WLS), with the weight being the number 
of individuals observed in a given year.14  In 
all regressions, the change in the log wage is 
multiplied by 100.  The estimated coefﬁcient 
on the change in the unemployment rate 
then approximates the percentage change 
in the wage for a one-point increase in the 
unemployment rate.
We can link (6) directly to the decomposi-
tion of wage cyclicality in (4).  When we use 
qˆ0t in (6), the estimated value of b01 gives the 
cyclical wage response of job stayers.  This is 
the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (4). 
Using qˆ1t and qˆ2t in (6), we obtain estimates 
of b11 and b21, that is, the incremental wage 
effects of within- and between-company job 
movers relative to job stayers.  These are 
reﬂected in the second and third terms of 
(4).
Estimating the Cyclicality of 
Internal and External Job Moves
We also estimate the cyclicality of internal 
(job to job within the same company) and 
external (company to company) moves. 
These comprise the fourth and ﬁfth terms 
in (4).  We use the same basic two-step ap-
proach, replacing 6lnwit in equation (5) 
with the binary variables in (1) and (2) that 
indicate, respectively, between- and within-job 
changes.  Speciﬁcally, our estimating equa-
tions take the form
(7) MKit = _AKit + Y qKtDt + pKit   
(K = W,B)
and
(8) qˆKt = bK0 + bK16Ut + bK2Yeart + pKt   
(K = W,B)
In line with the wage speciﬁcations, we 
estimate (7) using weighted least squares, 






15An alternative would be to use a probit or logit 
speciﬁcation.  We use the linear probability model to 
be consistent with the approach of Solon et al. (1997), 
and also because it allows us to take a two-step approach 
to deal with the clustering issue that is analogous to our 
approach with wages.  The probit approach, we ﬁnd, 




measure that would weight each individual by hours 
worked.  However, we have veriﬁed that, in practice, the 
terms in (3) are very similar to those that are weighted 
by hours worked.
14Instead of WLS, we could do Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) in the second stage using the estimated 
variance-covariance matrix of the year dummies in the 
ﬁrst stage.  We have veriﬁed that this approach yields 
coefﬁcient estimates and standard errors that are virtually 
identical to WLS, so we use the simpler approach.
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Composition of Movers 
over the Business Cycle
Our estimates will be biased if there are 
systematic differences in the types of individu-
als who move over the business cycle that are 
not accounted for by the ﬁxed individual 
effects and age variables in the estimating 
equations.  For example, if movers during 
a boom are predominantly people whose 
productivity is increasing, and movers during 
a recession are predominantly people whose 
productivity is falling, we will have a procy-
clical bias for movers, and countercyclical 
bias for stayers.  For both men and women, 
we have calculated that the average internal 
and external mover comes from between the 
60th and 65th percentile of the respective 
wage distribution, during periods of both 
rising and falling unemployment.  While this 
similarity across the cycle is suggestive that 
composition bias is not a large problem, it 
is not possible to be deﬁnitive.
Results
Results based on our full NESPD male 
and female data are reported in Table 3.  We 
conﬁne our attention to the unemployment 
rate change coefﬁcients, estimated in step 2 of 
our regressions.  The table contains two sets 
of results.  The ﬁrst results refer to wages and 
the unemployment rate (equation 6), and the 
second to job moves and the unemployment 
rate (equation 8).  For both sets of results, we 
show estimates based on our three methods of 
distinguishing between internal and external 
movers (A, B, and C in Table 1).
Referring to the top half of the table, there 
are three main ﬁndings with respect to abso-
lute and relative real wage cyclicality.  First, 
both male and female stayers’ wages were 
strongly procyclical.  A one point reduction 
in the unemployment rate among male job 
stayers was associated with a 1.73% real wage 
increase.  The equivalent wage change for 
women was 1.66%.  Second, the real wages 
of between-company job movers displayed 
signiﬁcantly higher cyclicality than those of 
job stayers.  For male and female external 
movers, a one point reduction in the un-
employment rate was associated with a wage 
increase of, respectively, 2.9% and 2.5%. 
Third, male and female within-company job 
movers also exhibited stronger wage procy-
clicality than job stayers.  The increments are 
decidedly modest when compared with the 
external mover outcomes.  Among men, the 
wage responsiveness to a one point change 
in unemployment was about 10% higher for 
internal movers than for stayers, and among 
women the corresponding difference was 
about 15%.16
Since wage cyclicality was greater for ex-
ternal movers than for internal movers, one 
would expect that misclassiﬁcation would 
cause us to understate the cyclicality of ex-
ternal movers and overstate the cyclicality of 
internal movers.  This has implications for 
how one might expect the estimates to dif-
fer across our (A), (B), and (C) splits.  Our 
designated internal movers are more likely 
to include external movers in (A) than in (B) 
and especially (C).  Thus, we might expect 
to ﬁnd greater cyclicality for internal movers 
using (A) than using (C).  Our designated 
external movers are more likely to include 
internal movers in (C) than in (B) and es-
pecially (A).  Thus, we might also expect to 
ﬁnd greater cyclicality for external movers 
using (A) than using (C).  In actuality, we 
ﬁnd very little evidence for these types of pat-
terns, suggesting that the bias is not strongly 
related to the degree of misclassiﬁcation, 
maybe because the classiﬁcation is working 
fairly well in all cases.
The bottom half of the table reports job 
move/unemployment rate associations.  Esti-
mated procyclicality was stronger for external 
than internal job movers.  What accounts for 
this difference?  Figure 1 plots the estimated 
time dummies from equation (7) against the 
16The estimate for internal male movers in case (C) is 
not statistically signiﬁcant.  This may be due in part to our 
inability to obtain consistent 3-digit industry data across 
the entire time period.  We use three different 3-digit 
classiﬁcations for 1975–81, 1982–95, and 1996–2001, 
and so the internal/external mover deﬁnition is not 
fully consistent across time.  Additionally, movers in 
1982 and 1996 are dropped, since the previous years 
contain a non-matching classiﬁcation.  However, we 
have veriﬁed that if we include all years by using 1-digit 
industry codes for 1981–82 and 1995–96, the point 
estimates change very little.
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change in the national unemployment rate 
(del U).  The graphs are based on the (B) set 
of results and are not greatly altered if (A) 
and (C) are chosen.  The male and female 
within-company mover graphs are remarkably 
similar.  They reveal a procyclical pattern in 
the middle periods, from the early 1980s until 
the early 1990s.  Note, however, that the start 
and end periods do not exhibit cyclical job 
movements, with internal job changes display-
ing unbroken year to year declines from the 
mid-1970s to the mid-1980s.  This occurred 
despite a period of falling unemployment in 
the late 1970s.  This pattern may indicate 
that during the inﬂationary conditions and 
economic uncertainty associated with the 
OPEC supply shocks of the mid- and late 
1970s, medium-term pessimistic outlooks 
among companies detracted from an atmo-
sphere of more short-term expansion and 
job promotion. Additionally, the sharp un-
employment rate declines starting in 1993, 
followed by relatively low unemployment 
thereafter, do not appear to have stimulated 
growth in internal job changes.  In contrast, 
male and female external job moves were 
procyclical over a longer time period.  In 
particular, they appear to have been more 
cyclically responsive than internal moves in 
the early years.
One can rewrite equation (4) in a way that 
expresses total wage cyclicality in terms of the 
wage cyclicality of stayers and movers, and 
the cyclicality of moving behavior:
(9) ,E(6lnW)/,(6U) =
(1 – PW – PB)[,E(6lnWS)/,(6U)]
    + PW[,E(6lnWW)/,(6U)]     
+ PB[,E(6lnWB)/,(6U)]
     + [E(6lnWW – 6lnWS)],PW/,(6U)
     + [E(6lnWB – 6lnWS)],PB/,(6U).
Table 3.  Real Wage and Unemployment Rate Changes, 1975–2001.
Mover Identiﬁers Men Women
Coefﬁcient on (Ut – Ut–1)  Coefﬁcient on (Ut – Ut–1)
Incremental Incremental Incremental Incremental
Wage Effect Wage Effect Wage Effect Wage Effect
Wage Change for Internal for External for Internal for External
[Equation (6)] Job Stayers Movers Movers Job Stayers Movers Movers
(A) –1.73*** –0.24** –1.19*** –1.66*** –0.35** –0.83***
(0.45) (0.12) (0.18) (0.46) (0.15) (0.16)
(B) –1.73*** –0.24** –0.99*** –1.66*** –0.32** –0.76***
(0.45) (0.10) (0.17) (0.46) (0.17) (0.16)
(C) –1.73*** –0.03 –1.11*** –1.66*** –0.37** –0.76***
(0.45) (0.12) (0.16) (0.46) (0.14) (0.16)
Job Move Internal External Internal External
[Equation (8)] Job Movers Job Movers Job Movers Job Movers
(A) –0.004** –0.005*** –0.005** –0.006***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
(B) –0.003 –0.005*** –0.004 –0.007***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
(C) –0.004 –0.009** –0.005 –0.011***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  Results shown refer to step two of the two-stage estimation procedure. 
There are 26 observations at this stage.  The three-digit industry classiﬁcation used as part of identiﬁer (C) cannot 
be obtained on a consistent basis over the entire period.  The results are obtained using three different 3-digit 
classiﬁcations for 1975–81, 1982–95, and 1996–2001.  Accordingly, movers in 1982 and 1996 are dropped, since 
the previous years contain a non-matching classiﬁcation.  The three separate estimates for movers are based on the 
identiﬁers:  (A) 10 regions, 1-digit industries, public/private sector; (B) 97 areas, 1-digit industries, public/private sector; 
(C) 97 areas, 3-digit industries, public/private sector.
**Statistically signiﬁcant at the 05 level; ***at the .01 level, two-tail tests.
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Combining the results in Table 3 with the 
summary data in Table 2, we are in a posi-
tion to evaluate the separate contributions. 
Results are slightly different across the choice 
of mover identiﬁers, but reporting results for 
choice (B) (see Table 1) are nonetheless high-
ly representative.  Our male estimate of overall 
wage cyclicality (that is, E(6lnW)/,(6U) in 
equation 9) is –1.83%.  Of this aggregate 
ﬁgure, 84.3% is accounted for by the wages 
of job stayers, 6.4% by the wages of internal 
movers, 7.5% by the wages of external mov-
ers, 0.6% by internal job moves, and 1.1% 
by external job moves.  The overall female 
estimate of wage cyclicality is –1.78%, with 
respective percentage breakdowns of 81.4, 
8.1, 7.5, 1, and 2.  Wages of job stayers were 
highly procyclical, and job stayers account 
for nearly 90% of all observations in our 
data.  Unsurprisingly, therefore, their wage 
contribution dominates overall British wage 
cyclicality.
As discussed earlier, one model posits that 
employers may use promotions and demotions 
to achieve wage ﬂexibility in spite of the sticki-
ness of wages within jobs.  It is clear that this is 
not the dominant inﬂuence in contemporary 
Britain.  Wages within jobs seem sufﬁciently 
ﬂexible that internal job mobility plays a 
relatively minor role in moving aggregate 
wages in line with the business cycle.  Thus, it 
appears that this class of sticky wage models is 
not particularly applicable to Britain.
Comparison of Estimates to the Literature
Studies of wage cyclicality in the United 
States have tended to ﬁnd overall semi-elastici-
ties of between –1 and –2 for the association 
between real wage changes and the contem-
poraneous national rate of unemployment 
(Solon et al. 1994; Bils 1985).17  Our estimates 
for Britain are at the high end of this range. 
The coefﬁcients we ﬁnd for job stayers are 
higher than those that have been reported 
17However, using six cohorts of the National Longitu-
dinal Surveys, Grant (2003) obtained real wage/current 
unemployment rate semi-elasticities for young men and 
women of between –2 and –2.6.
Figure 1. Coefficients of Estimated Job Move Dummies against the Rate of National
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for employer stayers in the United States in 
recent panel data (Solon et al. 1994; Devereux 
2001; Shin and Solon 2004).  Hart (2006) 
split the sample between stayers and movers 
using the NESPD and found coefﬁcients for 
stayers similar to ours.
The main contribution of this paper is to 
differentiate between the wage procyclicality 
of internal and external movers.  Few other 
studies have made this distinction.  Solon et 
al. (1997), using U.S. historical data, found 
evidence that a large proportion of wage 
cyclicality was accounted for by internal job 
mobility, rather than through the cyclicality 
of wages of job stayers.  Wilson (1997) used 
recent data from two U.S. companies and 
found no evidence that the wages of position 
changers were more cyclical than the wages of 
position stayers.  Devereux (2000) obtained a 
similar result using state-year variation in the 
PSID over the 1980s.  While we ﬁnd that wages 
of internal movers are more procyclical than 
those of job stayers, job stayers in contempo-
rary Britain have very procyclical wages, and 
the process of internal mobility has little net 
impact on overall wage cyclicality.
There is also a related literature on nomi-
nal wage rigidity.  Most recent studies from 
the United States have concluded that, once 
measurement error is accounted for, nominal 
wage changes of stayers are downwardly rigid 
(for example, Altonji and Devereux 2000; 
Akerlof et al. 1996).  On the other hand, 
the British evidence suggests that nominal 
wage cuts are prevalent both in the BHPS 
(Smith 2000) and in the NESPD (Nickell 
and Quintini 2003).  Measurement error ap-
pears unlikely to be the full explanation, as 
Smith found many cuts even for individuals 
who reported having their pay stub in hand 
while answering the earnings questions.  Our 
ﬁndings that stayers in Britain have greater 
wage cyclicality than in the United States 
is consistent with these ﬁndings from the 
nominal wage rigidity literature.
Results by Public/Private Sector 
and by Collective Bargaining Status
In some organizations, promotions and 
other job changes may be largely based on 
agreed rules and laid-down formulas.  In these 
cases, the move from one job description to 
another may not be marked by signiﬁcant 
wage increments but merely involve an 
individual transferring from the top rungs 
of one ladder across to the bottom rungs 
of the next higher ladder.  Further, such 
moves may not correlate especially well with 
market conditions.  Other organizations may 
take a much more laissez faire approach to 
job change.  Productivity-based promotions 
may be especially important.  Big upward 
movements for high ﬂiers and demotions 
for under-performers are likely to be more 
prevalent in these cases, with productivity 
effects reﬂecting market conditions.
A priori, two highly interrelated divisions 
of the data may be expected to capture these 
general differences in approaches to internal 
job mobility.  The ﬁrst is the public/private 
sector split, and the second is the division 
between workers covered and not covered 
by collective bargaining agreements.  Over 
all observations in our data, 87% of men and 
88% of women in public sector jobs were 
covered by collective bargaining agreements. 
This contrasts with coverage of 28% for men 
and 21% for women in the private sector.  In 
general, the terms and conditions of work 
and pay in the public sector are relatively 
regularized.  First, the size and complexity of 
large governmental departments and public 
corporations spur greater recourse to the use 
of explicitly deﬁned rules and regulations 
concerning pay scales.  Second, occupational 
pay and employment conditions are standard-
ized across geographical areas.  Third, the 
prevalence of formal collective bargaining 
in the public sector reduces the likelihood 
of ad hoc decision-making over pay and jobs. 
The private sector is more heterogeneous 
and less regulated, with fewer impediments 
to the achievement of localized implicit and 
explicit agreements.
The estimates are in Table 4.  Among 
men in the private sector, the wages of both 
internal and external job movers were sig-
niﬁcantly more procyclical than the wages 
of stayers.18  This contrasts with men in the 
18Note that we only include observations in which the 
individual was in the same sector at t and t – 1.  Thus, the 
results for external moves should be treated with some 
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public sector, among whom neither type of 
mover exhibited signiﬁcantly greater wage 
effects than did stayers.  Consistent with 
greater ﬂexibility in the private sector, the 
difference between private and public sectors 
is statistically signiﬁcant for both internal 
and external movers.  The relative picture 
is similar for women, although the internal 
mover coefﬁcient for the private sector is 
not signiﬁcant at the 5% level and, unlike 
the external mover coefﬁcient, is not statis-
tically different from the equivalent public 
sector estimate.
The wages of internal and external job 
movers of both sexes who were not covered 
by a collective bargaining agreement were 
also signiﬁcantly more procyclical than were 
the wages of equivalent stayers.  By contrast, 
among workers covered by a collective bar-
gaining agreement, only the wages of male 
external movers displayed more cyclicality 
than the wages of stayers.  Consistent with 
uncovered workers having more ﬂexible work 
arrangements, the wages of uncovered work-
ers appear to have been more procyclical than 
those of covered workers, but the difference 
is statistically signiﬁcant only for internal 
movers (for both men and women).19
Unsurprisingly, the intersection of private 
sector and uncovered reveals patterns very 
similar to those discussed above for the private 
19Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) and Grant (2003), 
in their studies using U.S. data, also found union work-
ers to have lower wage procyclicality than non-union 
workers.
Table 4.  Real Wage Changes in Relation to Unemployment Changes 
by Sector, Collective Bargaining Coverage, and Age, 1975–2001.
Men  Women
Coefﬁcient on (Ut – Ut–1)  Coefﬁcient on (Ut –  Ut–1)
Incremental Incremental Incremental Incremental
Wage Effect Wage Effect Wage Effect Wage Effect
for Internal for External for Internal for External
Job Stayers Movers Movers Job Stayers Movers Movers
Private Sector –1.93*** –0.35*** –1.03*** –1.93*** –0.38 –0.91***
(0.37) (0.12) (0.19) (0.33) (0.21) (0.20)
Public Sector –1.39** 0.17 –0.12 –1.38 0.03 –0.21
(0.73) (0.23) (0.31) (0.73) (0.22) (0.25)
Covered by Agreement –1.50** 0.05 –0.45** –1.41** 0.16 –0.21
(0.67) (0.20) (0.21) (0.70) (0.24) (0.24)
Uncovered by Agreement –1.94*** –0.44*** –0.84*** –1.91*** –0.53*** –0.68***
(0.32) (0.16) (0.20) (0.33) (0.18) (0.20)
Private Sector and Uncovered –1.98*** –0.41*** –0.88*** –1.98*** –0.52*** –0.70***
(0.31) (0.13) (0.22) (0.32) (0.21) (0.21)
Public Sector and Covered –1.48** 0.29 –0.32 –1.47** 0.07 –0.22
(0.76) (0.27) (0.24) (0.76) (0.27) (0.25)
Young (Below Median Age) –1.84*** –0.40*** –0.91*** –1.86*** –0.25 –0.65***
(0.41) (0.12) (0.18) (0.42) (0.20) (0.17)
Old (Above Median Age) –1.59*** 0.05 –0.89*** –1.44*** –0.35 –0.65***
(0.50) (0.12) (0.17) (0.50) (0.19) (0.22)
Notes:  See notes to Table 2.  Reported results consist of movements determined by identiﬁer (B) (97 areas, 1-digit 
industries, public/private sector).  For job movers, “Private Sector and Uncovered” means that an individual was in 
the private sector and uncovered by a collective bargaining agreement in the new job at time t and the old job at 
time t – 1.  This matching between the two periods also applies to “Public Sector and Covered.”
**Statistically signiﬁcant at the 05 level; ***at the .01 level, two-tail tests.
caution, as the external movers included are those who 
chose to move to a different company in the same sector. 
This is, of course, a selected sample of external movers.
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20The other two intersections—that is, private sec-
tor E covered and public sector E uncovered—are not 
shown because the numbers of movers in these cases 
are too small to ensure reliable results.
21We also attempted to see whether the degree of 
wage cyclicality changed over time by splitting the sample 
period into two periods of equal length.  We found no 
statistically signiﬁcant differences, but this may be in part 
due to the lack of variation in the unemployment rate, 
particularly in the second of these shorter periods.
sector and the uncovered sector, with both 
kinds of movers having more cyclical wages 
than job stayers.  In contrast, the intersection 
of public sector and covered shows no statisti-
cally signiﬁcant differences between movers 
and stayers.20  Also, the only statistically sig-
niﬁcant difference between the two groups 
(private/uncovered versus public/covered) 
is for male internal movers.
Results by Age
In the ﬁnal two rows of Table 4, we split 
the sample at the median age (40 for men, 
35 for women) in order to examine how the 
estimates differ by age.  We ﬁnd that there are 
strong similarities across the two age groups 
for both men and women.  The sole exception 
is that wages for male internal movers were 
statistically signiﬁcantly more procyclical for 
younger than older men.  This is consistent 
with promotions and other internal moves 
being more likely among young workers, as 
would be implied by matching models of the 
labor market.21
Conclusions
In line with earlier studies, our British 
data demonstrate the value of distinguishing 
between job stayers and job movers in the 
study of real wage cyclicality (Hart 2006).  Ad-
ditionally, our work underlines the potential 
importance of separating movers who change 
jobs within companies and those who move 
between companies.  In our full samples, 
external movers exhibited considerably 
higher wage cyclicality than job stayers—in 
fact, between 30% and 40% higher—while 
wage cyclicality among internal movers was 
less markedly higher, at around 10–15%. 
When we disaggregate the data into private 
and public sectors and into workers covered 
and not covered by collective bargaining, the 
value added of making the mover distinctions 
becomes even more apparent.  We ﬁnd that 
wage cyclicality of both internal and external 
movers was considerably higher than that 
of stayers among private sector workers and 
those workers uncovered by collective agree-
ments.  Thus, it appears that employers who 
are less constrained by formal agreements 
and pay rules are more likely to adjust the 
wages of internal movers in line with outside 
economic conditions.
However, these ﬁndings should not detract 
from recognition of job stayers’ overwhelm-
ing importance in determining total British 
wage cyclicality.  While our results show that 
the relative wage cyclicality of job movers 
was higher than that of stayers, the absolute 
wage procyclicality of both stayers and movers 
was high.  Combining this latter observation 
with the fact that job stayers comprised about 
90% of all wage observations over the years 
studied, we ﬁnd that about 80–85% of overall 
real wage cyclicality in Britain was accounted 
for by job stayers.  These results suggest 
that sticky wage models that stress the role 
of job mobility in enabling wages to adjust 
to economic conditions are not particularly 
relevant to contemporary Britain.
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